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Abstract
This paper analyses the e¤ects of reducing unfunded social security in a closed
economy that consists of a service sector and a commodity sector. It is shown
that if old agents mainly demand labour intensive services, a modest decrease
of the pay-as-you-go pension scheme still raises long-run utility as long as the
economy is dynamically e¢cient. However, entirely privatising the social secu-
rity system will sooner lead to dynamic ine¢ciency than in the conventional
one-sector model, leading to a di¤erent conclusion about the desirability of
unfunded pensions.
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1 Introduction
Many developed countries are and will increasingly be confronted with an ageing of
their populations due to lower fertility rates and a longer life span. These upcoming
demographic changes will cause the relative number of elderly individuals to increase,
and thus urge many to reconsider the design of existing social security arrangements
that involve transfers between generations. One of the main concerns is the sus-
tainability of unfunded Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) pension schemes and health care
arrangements that are widely observed. As a matter of fact, contributing a constant
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1fraction ¿ of the wage to the PAYG-scheme when young yields a pension bene…t of
¿(1+n)(1+g) when old, where n is the rate of population growth and g denotes the
rate at which wages grow. Hence, as Aaron (1966) pointed out, the internal rate of
return from contributing to an unfunded social security scheme equals (1+n)(1+g).
But investing the same amount on the capital market yields a rate of return equal
to the interest rate r. So as long as the economy is dynamically e¢cient, i.e., if
r > (1+n)(1+g), a social security scheme decreases long-run welfare and individuals
wouldbe better o¤ if it were reduced. In case of dynamic ine¢ciency, individuals save
too much, in the sense that the capital stock is above the level at which consumption
per capitais maximal. This is due to the factthat individuals do not takeinto account
that increasing their own savings implies a lower interest rate for all individuals and
thereby reduces the return to the savings of others.1 Diamond (1965) showed that in
that case, government intervention is desirable: by transferring resources from young
to old agents (e.g. through government debt or a PAYG-pension scheme), welfare is
increased.
Population ageing deteriorates the internal rate of return of unfunded schemes
compared to the return that can be obtained from investing in physical capital. The
plea for replacing unfunded pension schemes by funded ones (often referred to as pri-
vatising social security) is therefore more often heard, because it would raise long-run
welfare. Martin Feldstein, for instance, asserted that a complete and fast transition
from unfunded to funded schemes by privatising social security was just the missing
piece in social security analysis (see Feldstein 1995, 1996). That piece was soon found
back: in the 2000 US presidential campaign, social security reform was a key issue.
However, an important piece seems to be missing in Feldstein’s analysis.2
A shift to a fully-funded system will boost savings3 and thereby lead to a lower
interest rate. The lower interest rate induces people to substitute away from old-age
consumptiontowards young-ageconsumption. Althoughthis is dictated by individual
1Naturally, this does not hold for a small open economy that faces an exogenously given (world)
interest rate. This paper therefore focuses on a closed economy.
2One missing piece is the negative e¤ects on the utility of the elderly alive at the time of the
transition to a privatised system. Social security reform is therefore not a Pareto-improving policy,
as was demonstrated by Verbon (1988) and Breyer (1989). In this paper, we restrict ourselves to
the long-run consequences of privatisation.
3As was shown by e.g. Feldstein (1974), Kotliko¤ and Summers (1981) and Modigliani (1988),
transfers from the young to the old, such as unfunded social security, discourage private savings,
which Feldstein dubbed the asset-substitution e¤ect.
2utility maximization, the result might bethatoldpeoplewill haverathermeagre levels
of consumption, while the young ones have abundant consumption streams. On the
other hand, if people wish to have a fairly constant standard of living over their
lifetime, and thus have a low elasticity of substitution between young and old-age
consumption, they will decide to save even more than due to the asset-substitution
e¤ect alone so as to transfer part of the higher income when young to their old age.
But the higher savings intensify the general-equilibrium e¤ects, making individual
savings less e¤ective as a device to smooth consumption over the lifetime.
This result will hold even stronger if people do not spend their money on the
same items during their entire lifetime and currently living generations face di¤erent
in‡ation rates as suggested in a recent issue of The Economist:
“Oneconsequenceofwidechanges inrelativepricesis that individualsmay face
widely di¤ering in‡ation rates, if their spending di¤ers much from thenational
average. Older people, for instance, are likely to spend more on medical care
and domestic services, such as those of gardeners and cleaners, that have risen
sharply in price. Younger people are likely to spend more on new products,
such as mobile phones or computers, which tend to fall rapidly in price during
their early years.” (The Economist “The Price of Age”, Dec. 21st 2000)
It seems indeed plausible to assume that the elderly spend relatively more on labour-
intensive services, both because of disability (which raises the demand for e.g. care
services and housekeeping assistance) and a lower preference for (high-tech) com-
modities, because the varieties of this kind of commodities constantly changes due
to innovation, and elderly people have more di¢culties learning how to apply these
new technologies and products. The price index of the elderly’s consumption basket
is then particularly sensitive to wage in‡ation. As noted above, such wage in‡ation
is one of the general-equilibrium e¤ects that accompany a transition to funded pen-
sions. So, if old-age consumption requires relatively much labour, the gap between
young-age and old-age consumption resulting from privatisation will be even larger,
and closing this gap through higher savings will be harder. More capital accumula-
tion will only intensify the decrease in the real interest rate but not increase old-age
consumption possibilities. It seems that this is a missing piece in the debate on social
security reform. The question this paper therefore addresses is whether the condition
of dynamic e¢ciency is still decisive with respect to the desirability of a PAYG-public
pension scheme. In other words, does it still hold in a multi-sector economy with dif-
3ferent generational demand patterns that privatising social security raises (long-run)
welfare as long as the interest rate exceeds the rate of economic growth?
It appears that this question can be answered a¢rmatively, at least for the case of
a small reduction of the unfunded part of social security: partially privatising social
security in a dynamically-e¢cient economy increases individuals’ lifetime income,
both in terms of commodities and services, and utility. However, it is likely that
after having totally privatised social security, the economy will end up in a situation
of dynamic ine¢ciency, something that may not happen in the standard one-sector
economy as applied by e.g. Feldstein. In that case, the optimal PAYG-tax is strictly
positive and complete privatisation of social security is not the best policy.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section2, we present a two-
sector, 2-OLG closed economy with a government that runs a PAYG-public pension
scheme. In one production sector, both physical capital and labour are employed
to produce commodities that are bought by young individuals for consumption and
investment purposes. The other sector deals withthe provision ofservices that do not
use capital goods. These services are demanded by old individuals only. In Section 3,
we look at how dynamic (in)e¢ciency is linked to the desirability of PAYG-pensions.
In Section 4, the optimal social security tax is calculated and compared to the one
that follows from the standard one-sector model. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Production of commodities and services
Following Baumol (1967), we distinguish two sectors of production. In the commodity
sector (labelled Y ), homogeneous goods are produced that either serve as consump-
tion or investment good. The production process involves the employment of both
physical capital and labour accordingtothe following Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion: Yt = K®
t (LY
t )1¡®, where Kt stands for the domestic capital stock and LY
t is the
number of people employed in the commodity sector.4 Production per employee is
described by ·®
t , where ·t ´ Kt
LY
t
denotes the capital-labour ratio. Firms are fully com-
petitive and maximise pro…ts, so the interest and wage rate are given by rt = ®·®¡1
t
and wt = (1 ¡ ®)·®
t respectively.
In the service sector (labelled D), labour is the only factor of production.5 One
4Allowing for a more general CES production function does not alter the results.
5These are both personal services (domestic services such as gardeners, cleaners, housekeepers,
4unit of labour translates into one service,6 so the total provision of services equals
total labour supply in this sector (LD
t ). The price of services in terms of commodities,
pt, is therefore equal to the wage rate in this sector. As labour is homogeneous and
and perfectly mobile across sectors, there is only one wage rate, so pt = wt.
Households
In each period, a young and an old generation of constant size N are alive.7 In-
dividuals inelastically supply one unit of labour when young and are retired in the
second period of their life. To simplify the analysis, we will assume young individuals
to consume only commodities (c), while elderly demand services (d) only.8 Lifetime












where ° is the private discount factor and µ > 0, so that the elasticity of substitution
is the constant 1=µ.
The government runs a PAYG social security scheme …nanced by a wage tax ¿, so
the bene…t level at time t equals ¿wt. Individual consumption possibilities are thus



















This condition shows that the ratio of young-age consumption over old-age services
is determined by the real interest rate
rt+1
wt+1 (unless they are perfect substitutes, i.e.,
butlers, and recreation and cultural services) and social services like nurses and physicians. Note
that these are not services like bank services which extensively use high-tech goods like computers.
6Another interpretation would be that the quality of services increases with the number of em-
ployees.
7Allowing for population growth does not alter the results.
8Note the similarity with Samuelson (1958). In that model, individuals are not able to save at
all because the goods are perishable. In our model, people can save, but when old, they do not
derive utility from the goods that they stored when young. Instead, they have to exchange these
commodities for services by paying a certain price to the young.































The model presented above comprises four markets, all characterised by fully
‡exible prices and are therefore simultaneously in equilibrium at each point in time.
The commodity market
Demand for commodities only comes from young individuals who spend their entire
after-tax wage income on commodities, both as consumption and investment. Ac-
cordingly, the equilibrium condition reads Yt = N(1 ¡ ¿)wt, which in case of the
speci…ed production function boils down to
lY
t = (1¡ ®)(1¡ ¿); (6)
with lY
t ´ LY
t =N. So as long as the social security tax is constant, the share of
young individuals employed in the commodity sector is constant as well. If the tax
is increased, young agents have less to spend on commodities and fewer people will
be active in the commodity sector.
The services market
As described before, one service requires the input of exactly one employee, so the
total provision of services is LD




Thetotal labour force attimet consists of all youngindividuals, whoeach inelastically






t = N: (7)
9One could also assume that every person works part-time in both sectors.
6This, together with equilibrium on the commodities and services market, gives the
individual number of services that each person uses when old,
dt = ® + ¿ ¡ ®¿: (8)
Althoughthe individual demandfor old-age consumptionwill generally dependonthe
substitution elasticity, the services that will be supplied to a retired person depend,
according to equation (8), only on the production elasticity ® and the social security
tax ¿.10
The capital market
Since there is no scope for international lending and borrowing, aggregate savings
are entirely invested domestically. If capital fully depreciates after one period,11 this













From this, the steady state capital-labour ratio can be calculated. Totally di¤erenti-
ating this expression gives the following di¤erence equation









so the steady state is stable if ®¡·®¡1
1+¡ ¡
®(1¡¿)(1+¡)µ
®(1¡¿)(1+µ¡)+¿ < 0. This is assumed to be the
case.
3 Privatising social security
Privatisation of social security as proposed by Feldstein is one big jump from an
unfunded to a funded scheme. A less extreme approach would be to reduce the
PAYG-tax to a permanently lower but still positive level. The option we consider
…rst is a marginal decrease, so if the economy is initially dynamically e¢cient, it
10This result is due to the Cobb-Douglas speci…cation of production. For more general speci…ca-
tions, the parameter µ will a¤ect the equilibrium quantity of dt as well, but the positive relation
between ¿ and dt remains.
11Allowing for depreciation would not change the results.
7can be assumed to remain so. After that, we analyse a complete privatisation of
social security. In contrast to what Feldstein (1996) assumes, the economy may then
become dynamically ine¢cient, especially in the two-sector model we apply.
In a dynamically-e¢cient economy, a marginal reduction of the social security
tax raises lifetime income (ceteris paribus). Moreover, the reverse asset-substitution
e¤ect induces the young to save more. This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 1 In the two-sector model as presented above, a PAYG-system reduces
the long-run capital-labour ratio. (Partially) privatising social security therefore in-
creases ·.












®(1¡ ¿)(1+ µ¡) + ¿
¶
< 0: ¥ (11)
With a lower PAYG-tax, people have a stronger incentive to save,12 because a smaller
part of their old-age income is provided through the government by their children.
These higher national savings imply a higher capital stock. However, as can be seen
from (6), less labour is attracted to the services sector, leaving more employees to
work with the capital stock. Because the …rst e¤ect is dominant, the capital labour
ratio increases.13
In a closed economy, the return to the funds invested at the capital market will
be lower, and at the same time, employees can work with a higher number of capital
goods, sotheir productivity and thereby their wage rate increases. In order toprevent
labour moving out of the services sector, wages will rise in that sector too, making
services more expensive.14 An individual is therefore confronted with higher earnings
when young, enabling him to purchase more commodities which raises his utility, but
when old, he faces both a lower return to his savings and a higher in‡ation, so the
purchasing power when old could decrease.
12From the equilibrium condition for the capital market, s = ·(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ¿), it follows that
ds
d¿ = (1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ¿)
d·
d¿ ¡ ·(1¡ ®) < 0.
13· would decrease if LY increased strongly. But then, the interest rate would increase and the
wage would decrease, thus stimulating the demand for services, which contradicts the sharp rise of
LY .
14This is the well-known Baumol-e¤ect: services become more expensive because of rising pro-
ductivity in the capital-intensive sector.
8Proposition 2 Marginally reducing the unfunded part of pension schemes leads to
a higher lifetime income if the economy is dynamically e¢cient, both in terms of
commodities and (current) services. The consumption level for young individuals
rises whereas the number of services enjoyed when old decreases.













d¿, which is negative if r >










d¿, which is also negative if the economy is dynamically e¢cient.
Equilibrium on the capital market can be written as · = ·® ¡ c
(1¡®)(1¡¿), so dc
d¿ =
















< 0. Furthermore, equation (8) immediately
results in
d(d)
d¿ = 1 ¡ ® > 0. ¥
So the Aaron-condition also holds in the two-sector model. The change in consump-
tion when young and old is due to several e¤ects. The …rst is the positive income
e¤ect of a lower social security tax on lifetime income, which raises c and d. Second,
the interest rate decreases. This causes a negative income e¤ect on c and d, a positive
substitution e¤ect on c and a negative substitution e¤ect on d. Third, the wage rises,
which implies a higher labour income and thus has a positive income e¤ect on both
c and d, but because it is also the price of services, it implies a positive substitution
e¤ect on c and a negative substitution e¤ect on d. The total e¤ect is a higher con-
sumption level of commodities when young and a lower amount of services when old.
Table 1 summarises these e¤ects.
¿ # r # w " total
IE IE SE IE SE e¤ect
c + - + + + +
d + - - + - -
Table 1 E¤ects of (marginally) reducing the social security tax
The question then is whether lifetime utility increases as well if the social security
system is privatised. The most obvious way to evaluate this is to compare the implicit
return to individuals from contributing to the unfunded social security scheme (keep-
ing the contribution rate constant) with the explicit return that can be obtainedfrom
investing the same amount at the capital market, which in our model corresponds to
9the interest rate. If the latter exceeds the former, which seems to be the case in most
countries, the economy is said to be dynamically e¢cient and transferring an amount
through a PAYG-scheme enables individuals to purchase less commodities when old
than what they could have bought if the same amount were invested in a funded
scheme. Consequently, reducing the unfunded part of social security raises long-run
welfare, and thereverse holdsina dynamically-ine¢cient economy. However, this rea-
soning does not take account of general-equilibrium e¤ects and the di¤erent spending
patterns of young and old generations. In particular, contributing to the unfunded
social security scheme via a proportional wage tax yields a ‘return’ that is linked to
the wage that the next generation earns, which is also the price of the services an
individual buys when old. Hence, a PAYG-scheme yields a …xed return in terms of
services. On the other hand, investing at the capital mark through a funded scheme
gives a return in commodities, so that the elderly are sensitive to price increases. One
can wonder whether the higher consumption level when young compensates for the
loss of services when old in terms of lifetime utility. That is, does a reduction of the
social security tax raise lifetime utility in the two-sector model?
Proposition 3 (Marginally) reducing the unfunded part of pension schemes implies
a higher lifetime utility.
Proof The e¤ect of a marginal change of the social security tax on lifetime utility
can be traced by linearising around the initial steady state. Utility changes according
to
dU
d¿ = c¡µ dc
d¿ + °d¡µ d(d)

























Clearly, the …rst term is negative if the economy is dynamically e¢cient, i.e., if
r = ®·®¡1 > 1, and positive in the case of dynamic ine¢ciency. From (9) it follows






, so dynamic e¢ciency is equivalent to ®(1¡¿)(1+
¡)+¿¡(1¡¿)¡ > 0. Inserting this and (3) into (12) implies that the last term of(12)
is positive (negative) if the economy is dynamically e¢cient (ine¢cient). Knowing
that d·
d¿ < 0, it follows that dU
d¿ Q= if r R 1. ¥
One can conclude from this that despite the fact that individuals face di¤erent prices
over their lifetime, the golden rule still holds in the two-sector model: lifetime utility
is maximal if the interest rate equals the rate of economic growth. If the social
security tax is such that
dU
d¿ > 0, people save too much in the sense that the utility of
10current and future generations is increased when the PAYG-scheme is (marginally)
extended. Elderly then bene…t from a higher social security bene…t, and the current
young and all future generations will have a higher lifetime income. This is so because
individuals do not take into account that their own savings have adownward e¤ect on
the(future)interest rateandanupwarde¤ect onthe (future) wage, which alsore‡ects
the price of the services they will enjoy when old. By creating a disincentive to save,
thegovernment internalises this negativeexternality andthereby increases welfare. In
the opposite case (dynamic e¢ciency), a marginal increase of the PAYG-tax reduces
the utility of currently young individuals and all future generation (although it still
increases the utility of the current elderly), because their lifetime income is reduced
whenthe ine¢cient unfunded scheme is extended. Therefore, theproposal to decrease
the unfunded part of social security and simultaneously increase the funded part
would still bene…t current young and future generations if r > 1.
However, this conclusion is basedon asmall reduction ofthe PAYG-scheme. Some
proposals encompass the entire abolition of the PAYG-scheme, for this would bring
about maximum welfare gains. The following section deals with this issue.
4 Abolishing PAYG: When does it go wrong?
If the social security system is marginally privatised, lifetime income increases in a
dynamically-e¢cient economy, both in terms of commodities and services. Figure
1 shows consumption when young and services when old as a function of the social
security tax, for two di¤erent substitution elasticities.15 From this …gure, we can
see that a reduction of the social security tax always goes along with lower service
provision to the elderly. If people prefer a smooth consumption pattern over their
lifetime (i.e., if µ is rather high) they will try to carry over a large part of the net-
income gainwhen young to their old-age by saving more. We know from equation (2),
however, that market forces will not allow larger old-age consumption: higher savings
only cause wage in‡ation which diminishes retirees’ purchasing power. For low tax
rates (¿ < 0:1), the attempts to close the gap between consumption of commodities
and services may eventually even result in lower young-age consumption. Obviously,
complete privatisation of social security will then not be the optimal policy. That is,
15The underlying parameter values of this picture are ® = 0:3, ° = 0:7 and µ = 0:5 and 2
respectively. Furthermore, LY is multiplied by 2 in the production function.
11the economy will become dynamically ine¢cient at a positive tax rate.16










Figure 1 Level of consumption when young and services when old
Of course, since Diamond’s seminal (1965) paper it is well-known that in a one-sector
model the market can generate dynamic ine¢ciency as well. Ina two-sector economy,
however, the di¤erent spending patterns of generations spur the savings incentives
of privatisation, thus creating a larger bias towards dynamic ine¢ciency. This can
clearly be seen if one compares the golden-rule tax rate for a one-sector and a two-
sector model.
The capital-labour ratio that coincides with the golden rule in our two-sector






From (9) we can then calculate the social security tax that accords with the golden





Suppose individuals consume the same items when young and old. In that case,
we can replace dt+1 in the utility function by co
t+1, and the intertemporal budget
16As a matter of fact, the economy is only dynamically e¢cient in Figure 1 for values of ¿ exceeding










The …rst-order condition for which utility is maximised is then co
t+1 = (°rt+1)
1=µ ct,
so that individual savings can be calculated to be








with¢t+1 ´ °1=µ (rt+1)
(1¡µ)=µ. Equilibrium onthe capital market implies Nst = Kt+1,
so that ·t+1 = st. Combining this with (13) and again assuming a Cobb-Douglas
production function, the resulting steady-state capital-labour ratio for the one-sector











Figure 2 shows these social security taxes that belong to the golden rule as a
function of µ.
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Figure 2 Social security tax matching the golden rule
13Note that in the two-sector model the optimal tax rate is strictly positive for nearly
all values of µ. Only if extremely high elasticities of substitution prevail complete
privatisation of social security will unambiguously imply long-run welfare gains. The
di¤erence with a one-sector model is striking. For a large range of substitution elas-
ticities (i.e., for 0:3 < µ < 1:25) privatisation increases welfare in the one-sector
economy, but not necessarily in the two-sector economy. If this is the relevant range
to consider, then Feldstein’s assertion that the PAYG-system should be abolished
in order to raise the utility of future generations only makes sense if the economy
looks like a one-sector economy, or, in other words, when the consumption patterns
of young and old individuals do not di¤er too dramatically. If, however, the elderly
consume relatively many labour-intensive services, pleas for privatisation are very
misleading. In that case, the best policy would be to increase rather than decrease
the social security tax. As shown in Figure 2, the optimal tax rate for a substitution
elasticity around one is almost 17%, a value that is very much unprecedented in the
US. In reality, the curve will lie somewhere in between, but nevertheless, the optimal
tax is positive for realistic values of µ.
5 Conclusion
Feldstein’s claim that abolishing PAYG-schemes raises long-run welfare is missing
an important point. If old individuals mostly rely on labour-intensive services, then
extra savings, generated by privatisation of social security, create general-equilibrium
e¤ects that corrode their purchasing power. A vicious circle might arise: individuals
save more in order to protect themselves against rising prices of services that are
urgently needed in old age. However, these additional savings become futile, as
they lead to even higher prices of these services. From that perspective, privatising
social security may one day turn into a political dead-end street. The position of the
elderly then mimics their position in the Great Depression when the value of their
savings dwindled to negligible values, prompting the introduction of social security
by president Roosevelt.
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